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Kalam cosmological argument

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For the book on the topic by William Lane Craig, see The Kalām Cosmological Argument.

William Lane Craig (born 1949), who revived the Kalam during the 20th and 21st centuries

The Kalam cosmological argument is a modern formulation of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. It is named after the Kalam (medieval Islamic scholasticism) from which many of its key ideas originated.[1] Philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig was principally responsible for revitalizing the argument in modern academic discourse through his book The Kalām Cosmological Argument (1979), as well as other writings.

The argument's key underpinning idea is the metaphysical impossibility of actual infinities and of a temporally past-infinite universe, traced by Craig to 11th-century Persian Muslim scholastic philosopher Al-Ghazali. This feature distinguishes it from other cosmological arguments, such as that of Thomas Aquinas, which rests on the impossibility of a causally ordered infinite regress, and those of Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, which refer to the principle of sufficient reason.[2]

Since Craig's original publication, the Kalam cosmological argument has elicited public debate between Craig and Graham Oppy, Adolf Grünbaum, J. L. Mackie and Quentin Smith, and has been used in Christian apologetics.[3] According to Michael Martin, the cosmological arguments presented by Craig, Bruce Reichenbach, and Richard Swinburne are "among the most sophisticated and well-argued in contemporary theological philosophy".[4]

Form of the argument[edit]

The most prominent form of the argument, as defended by William Lane Craig, states the Kalam cosmological argument as the following syllogism:[5]

  1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
  2. The universe began to exist.
  3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Given the conclusion, Craig appends a further premise and conclusion based upon a philosophical analysis of the properties of the cause of the universe:[6]

  1. If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans (without) the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.
  2. Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.

Referring to the implications of Classical Theism that follow from this argument, Craig writes:[7]

"... transcending the entire universe there exists a cause which brought the universe into being ex nihilo ... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."

Historical background[edit]

The Kalam cosmological argument was influenced by the concept of the prime-mover, introduced by Aristotle. The argument originates in the works of theologian and philosopher John Philoponus (490–570 AD)[8] and was developed substantially under the medieval Islamic scholastic tradition during the Islamic Golden Age. Important historical proponents include Al-Kindi,[9] Al-Ghazali[10] and St. Bonaventure.[11][12][13]

One of the earliest formulations of the argument is described by Islamic philosopher and theologian Al-Ghazali:[14]

"Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins; therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning."

The argument developed as a concept within Islamic theology between the 9th and 12th centuries, refined in the 11th century by Al-Ghazali (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and in the 12th by Ibn Rushd (Averroes).[15] It reached medieval Christian philosophy in the 13th century and was discussed by Bonaventure as well as Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica (I, q.2, a.3) and Summa Contra Gentiles (I, 13).

Islamic perspectives may be divided into positive Aristotelian responses strongly supporting the argument, such as those by Al-Kindi and Averroes, and negative responses critical of it, including those by Al-Ghazali and Muhammad Iqbal.[16] Al-Ghazali was unconvinced by the first-cause arguments of Al-Kindi, arguing that only the infinite per se (that is an essentially ordered infinite series) is impossible, arguing for the possibility of the infinite per accidens (that is an accidentally ordered infinite series). He writes:[17]

"According to the hypothesis under consideration, it has been established that all the beings in the world have a cause. Now, let the cause itself have a cause, and the cause of the cause have yet another cause, and so on ad infinitum. It does not behove you to say that an infinite regress of causes is impossible."

Muhammad Iqbal also stated:[18]

"A finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an un-caused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds."

Contemporary discourse[edit]

According to atheist philosopher Quentin Smith, "a count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defense of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence."[19]

The Kalam cosmological argument has received criticism from philosophers such as J. L. Mackie, Graham Oppy, Adolf Grunbaum, Michael Martin, Quentin Smith and Wes Morriston as well as physicists Sean M. Carroll, Paul Davies, Lawrence Krauss and Victor Stenger.[20]

Modern discourse encompasses the fields of both philosophy and science (e.g. the fields of quantum physics and cosmology), which Bruce Reichenbach summarises as:[21]

"... whether there needs to be a cause of the first natural existent, whether something like the universe can be finite and yet not have a beginning, and the nature of infinities and their connection with reality".

Since the temporal ordering of events is central, the Kalam argument also brings issues of the nature of time into the discussion.[22]

Premise one: "Whatever begins to exist has a cause."[edit]

Craig and Sinclair have stated that the first premise is obviously true, at the very least more plausibly true than its negation.[23] Craig offers three reasons why the first premise is true:[24][25]

  1. Rational intuition: Craig states that the first premise is self-evidently true, being based upon the metaphysical intuition that "something cannot come into being from nothing", or "ex nihilo nihil fit", originating from Parmenidean philosophy.
  2. Reductio ad absurdum: If false, it would be inexplicable why just anything and everything does not randomly come into existence without a cause. To come into being without any cause is to come into being from nothing, which he says is surely absurd.
  3. Inductive reasoning from both common experience and scientific evidence, which constantly verifies and never falsifies its truth.

According to Reichenbach, "the Causal Principle has been the subject of extended criticism", which can be divided into philosophical and scientific criticisms.[26]

Philosophical objections[edit]

Graham Oppy, J. L. Mackie and Wes Morriston have objected to the intuitiveness of the first premise.[27][28][29] Oppy states:

"Mackie, [Adolf] Grunbaum, [Quentin] Smith and I—among many others—have taken issue with the first premise: why should it be supposed that absolutely everything which begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist?"

Mackie affirms that there is no good reason to assume a priori that an uncaused beginning of all things is impossible. Moreover, that the Causal Principle cannot be extrapolated to the universe from inductive experience. He appeals to David Hume's thesis (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) that effects without causes can be conceived in the mind, and that what is conceivable in the mind is possible in the real world.[30] This argument has been criticised by Bruce Reichenbach and G.E.M. Anscombe, who point out the phenomenological and logical problems in inferring factual possibility from conceivability.[31][32] Craig notes:[33][34]

"Hume himself clearly believed in the causal principle. He presupposes throughout the Enquiry that events have causes, and in 1754 he wrote to John Stewart, 'But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause'".

Morriston asserts that causal laws are physical processes for which we have intuitive knowledge in the context of events within time and space, but that such intuitions do not hold true for the beginning of time itself. He states:[35]

"We have no experience of the origin of worlds to tell us that worlds don't come into existence like that. We don't even have experience of the coming into being of anything remotely analogous to the "initial singularity" that figures in the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe."

In reply, Craig has maintained that causal laws are unrestricted metaphysical truths that are "not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist", remarking:[36]

"The history of twentieth century astrophysical cosmology belies Morriston's claim that people have no strong intuitions about the need of a causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe."

Quantum physics[edit]

A common objection to premise one appeals to the phenomenon of quantum indeterminacy, where, at the subatomic level, the causal principle ("everything that begins to exist has a cause") appears to break down.[37] Craig replies that the phenomenon of indeterminism is specific to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, pointing out that this is only one of a number of different interpretations, some of which he states are fully deterministic (mentioning David Bohm) and none of which are as yet known to be true. He concludes that subatomic physics is not a proven exception to the first premise.[38]

The philosopher Quentin Smith has cited the example of virtual particles, which appear and disappear from observation, apparently at random, to assert the tenability of uncaused natural phenomena.[39] In his book A Universe from Nothing: Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing, cosmologist Lawrence Krauss has proposed how quantum mechanics can explain how space-time and matter can emerge from 'nothing' (referring to the quantum vacuum). Philosopher Michael Martin has also referred to quantum vacuum fluctuation models to support the idea of a universe with uncaused beginnings. He writes:[40]

"Even if the universe has a beginning in time, in the light of recently proposed cosmological theories this beginning may be uncaused. Despite Craig's claim that theories postulating that the universe 'could pop into existence uncaused' are incapable of 'sincere affirmation,' such similar theories are in fact being taken seriously by scientists."

Philosopher of science David Albert has criticised the use of the term 'nothing' in describing the quantum vacuum. In a review of Krauss's book, he states:[41]

"Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states—no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems—are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn't this or that particular arrangement of the fields—what it is (obviously, and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple absence of the fields."

Likewise, Craig has argued that the quantum vacuum, in containing quantifiable, measurable energy, cannot be described as 'nothing', therefore, that phenomena originating from the quantum vacuum cannot be described as 'uncaused'. On the topic of virtual particles, he writes:[42]

"For virtual particles do not literally come into existence spontaneously out of nothing. Rather the energy locked up in a vacuum fluctuates spontaneously in such a way as to convert into evanescent particles that return almost immediately to the vacuum."

Cosmologist Alexander Vilenkin has stated that even "the absence of space, time and matter" cannot truly be defined as 'nothing' given that the laws of physics are still present, though it would be "as close to nothing as you can get".[43]

Premise two: "The universe began to exist."[edit]

Craig defends premise two using both physical arguments with evidence from cosmology and physics, and metaphysical arguments for the impossibility of actual infinities in reality.

Cosmology and physics[edit]

For physical evidence, Craig appeals to:

  1. Scientific confirmation against a past-infinite universe in the form of the second law of thermodynamics.[44]
  2. Scientific evidence that the universe began to exist a finite time ago at the Big Bang.[44]
  3. The Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem,[45] a cosmological theorem which deduces that any universe that has, on average, been expanding throughout its history cannot have been expanding indefinitely in the past but must have a past boundary at which inflation began.

Professor Alexander Vilenkin, one of the three authors of the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem, writes:[46]

"A remarkable thing about this theorem is its sweeping generality. We made no assumptions about the material content of the universe. We did not even assume that gravity is described by Einstein's equations. So, if Einstein's gravity requires some modification, our conclusion will still hold. The only assumption that we made was that the expansion rate of the universe never gets below some nonzero value, no matter how small."

Vilenkin and Alan Guth have stated in interviews that the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem per se does not entail an absolute beginning of the universe, instead that it implies that inflation must have had a beginning.[47] Though it leaves the door open for theories other than an absolute beginning, Vilenkin has discussed the untenability of theories that would claim to avoid a cosmological beginning (including eternal inflation, cyclic and cosmic egg models) concluding: "All the evidence we have says that the universe had a beginning".[48] In his publications, he would propose that the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem is sufficient evidence for a beginning of the universe.[49][50][51]

Victor J. Stenger has referred to the Aguirre–Gratton model[52] for eternal inflation as an exemplar by which to avoid a cosmic beginning.[53] In correspondence with Stenger, Vilenkin remarked how the Aguirre–Gratton model attempts to evade a beginning by reversing the "arrow of time" at t = 0, but that: "This makes the moment t = 0 rather special. I would say no less special than a true beginning of the universe."[54]

Actual infinities[edit]

On the metaphysical impossibility of actual infinities, Craig asserts:[55]

  1. The metaphysical impossibility of an actually infinite series of past events; citing the famous Hilbert's Hotel thought experiment.
  2. The impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition, referencing Bertrand Russell's example of Tristram Shandy.[56][57]

Michael Martin disagrees with these assertions by Craig, saying:[58]

"Craig's a priori arguments are unsound or show at most that actual infinities have odd properties. This latter fact is well known, however, and shows nothing about whether it is logically impossible to have actual infinities in the real world."

Thomist philosopher Dr. Edward Feser has claimed that past and future events are potential rather than actual, meaning that an infinite past could exist in a similar way to how an infinite number of potential halfway points exist between any two given points.[59] A theological argument for the possibility of actual infinities is that it may be within the scope of God's omnipotence to create an infinite spacetime.[citation needed]

Andrew Loke has argued that a beginningless universe and an actual infinite existing in the real world are metaphysically impossible.[60] Further thought experiments, such as "Methuselah's diary", have also been used to illustrate the metaphysical impossibility of an infinite past.[61]

Conclusion: "The universe has a cause."[edit]

Given that the Kalam cosmological argument is a deductive argument, if both premises are true, the truth of the conclusion follows necessarily.

In a critique of Craig's book The Kalam Cosmological Argument, published in 1979, Michael Martin states:[62]

"It should be obvious that Craig's conclusion that a single personal agent created the universe is a non sequitur. At most, this Kalam argument shows that some personal agent or agents created the universe. Craig cannot validly conclude that a single agent is the creator. On the contrary, for all he shows, there may have been trillions of personal agents involved in the creation."

Martin also claims that Craig has not justified his claim of creation "ex nihilo", pointing out that the universe may have been created from pre-existing material in a timeless or eternal state. Moreover, that Craig takes his argument too far beyond what his premises allow in deducing that the creating agent is greater than the universe. For this, he cites the example of a parent "creating" a child who eventually becomes greater than he or she.[63]

In the subsequent Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, published in 2009, Craig discusses the properties of the cause of the universe, arguing that they follow as consequences of a conceptual analysis and of the cause of the universe and by entailment from the initial syllogism of the argument:[64]

  1. A first state of the material world cannot have a material explanation and must originate ex nihilo in being without material cause, because no natural explanation can be causally prior to the very existence of the natural world (space-time and its contents). It follows necessarily that the cause is outside of space and time (timeless, spaceless), immaterial, and enormously powerful, in bringing the entirety of material reality into existence.
  2. Even if positing a plurality of causes prior to the origin of the universe, the causal chain must terminate in a cause which is absolutely first and uncaused, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which Craig and Sinclair argue is impossible.
  3. Occam's Razor maintains that the absolute unity of the First Cause should be assumed unless there are specific reasons to believe that there is more than one causeless cause.
  4. Agent causation, volitional action, is the only ontological condition in which an effect can arise in the absence of prior determining conditions. Therefore, only personal, free agency can account for the origin of a first temporal effect from a changeless cause.
  5. Abstract objects, the only other ontological category known to have the properties of being uncaused, spaceless, timeless and immaterial, do not sit in volitional causal relationships.

Craig concludes that the cause of the existence of the universe is an "uncaused, personal Creator ... who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful"; remarking upon the theological implications of this union of properties.

Theories of time[edit]

Craig holds to the A-theory of time, also known as the "tensed theory of time" or presentism, as opposed to its alternative, the B-theory of time, also known as the "tenseless theory of time" or eternalism. The latter would allow the universe to exist tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block, under which circumstances the universe would not "come into being":[65] He explains that the Kalam cosmological argument is established upon the A-theory:[66]

"From start to finish, the Kalam cosmological argument is predicated upon the A-Theory of time. On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitely extended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived."

Craig has defended the A-theory against objections from J. M. E. McTaggart and hybrid A–B theorists.[67] Philosopher Yuri Balashov has criticised Craig's attempt to reconcile the A-theory with special relativity by relying on a 'neo‐Lorentzian interpretation' of Special Relativity.[68] Balashov claims:[69]

"Despite the fact that presentism has the firm backing of common sense and eternalism revolts against it, eternalism is widely regarded as almost the default view in contemporary debates, and presentism as a highly problematic view."

In response, Craig has criticised Balashov for adopting a verificationist methodology that fails to address the metaphysical and theological foundations of the A-theory.[70]

In a 2020 interview, Craig explained that the Kalam cosmological argument could be adapted to the B-theory of time by:[71]

  1. Abandoning the metaphysical argument against forming an actual infinity by successive addition.
  2. Modifying the causal premise (replacing its appeal to the concept of 'coming into being without a cause' with the concept of 'beginning to exist without a cause').

The scientific evidence for the finitude of the past would still be valid under the B-theory and the argument as a whole, though damaged and requiring reformulation, would still be tenable. Philosopher Ben Waters has also argued that a defense of the Kalam cosmological argument does not require a commitment to the A-theory.[72]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ William Lane Craig. "The Kalam Cosmological Argument".
  2. ^ "Cosmological Argument". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 11 October 2017. Retrieved 15 May 2018.
  3. ^ Graham Smith, "Arguing about the Kalam Cosmological Argument," Philo, 5(1), 2002: 34–61. See also: Reichenbach, 2004
  4. ^ Martin, 1990: 101
  5. ^ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 102
  6. ^ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 194
  7. ^ Craig, 2000: 149
  8. ^ Erasmus 2018, p. 41–52.
  9. ^ Al-Kindi, On First Philosophy, with an Introduction and Commentary by Alfred L. Ivry (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1974), pp. 67–75
  10. ^ al Ghazali, Kitab al lqtisad, with a foreword by Î. A. Çubukçu and H. Atay (Ankara: University of Ankara Press, 1962), pp. 15–16.
  11. ^ Francis J. Kovach, 'The Question of the Eternity of the World in St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas – A Critical Analysis', Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5 (1974), pp. 141–172.
  12. ^ Smith, 2007: 183
  13. ^ Craig, 2000
  14. ^ Craig, 1994: 80
  15. ^ Averroes, Ibn Rushd, The Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahafut al-Tahafut) London:Luzac, 1954, pp. 58
  16. ^ Iqbal, Muhammad The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam Lahore:Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986
  17. ^ Al-Ghazzali, Tahafut Al-Falasifah (The Incoherence of Philosophers), translated by Sabih Ahmad Kamali. Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963 pp. 90–91
  18. ^ Iqbal, Mohammad. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. United States: Stanford University Press, 2013., Chapter II 'The Philosophic Test of the Revelations of Religious Experience' p.23
  19. ^ Quentin Smith, "Kalam Cosmological Arguments for Atheism", in Michael Martin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 183
  20. ^ Reichenbach, 2004: 4.1
  21. ^ Reichenbach, 2004: 5.6
  22. ^ Reichenbach, Bruce, "Cosmological Argument", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2021/entries/cosmological-argument.
  23. ^ The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, Edited by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, Wiley-Blackwell, The Kalam Cosmological Argument, p. 182, by William Lane Craig and James D. Sinclair
  24. ^ Craig, 1994: 92
  25. ^ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 182–190
  26. ^ Reichenbach, 2004: 5.1
  27. ^ Oppy G (2002). Arguing About The Kalam Cosmological Argument. Philo 5 (1):34–61
  28. ^ Mackie, 1982: 94
  29. ^ Morriston W (2002). Causes and Beginnings in the Kalam Argument. Faith and philosophy, 19(2).
  30. ^ Mackie, 1982: 85
  31. ^ Reichenbach, 2004: 3.4
  32. ^ G.E.M. Anscombe, '"Whatever has a beginning of existence must have a cause": Hume's argument exposed', Analysis XXXIV (1974), 150.
  33. ^ Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument, William Lane Craig
  34. ^ David Hume to John Stewart, February 1754, in The Letters of David Hume, 2 vols., ed. J. T. Grieg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1, 187
  35. ^ Morriston W (2000). Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause? A Critical Examination of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Faith and Philosophy, 17:149.
  36. ^ Reasonablefaith.org at the Wayback Machine (archived 10 January 2015)], William Lane Craig
  37. ^ Davies, Paul (1982). Superforce. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 94.
  38. ^ Moreland, James Porter, and William Lane. Craig. Philosophical foundations for a Christian worldview. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity P. 469
  39. ^ Smith, Q (1988), "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe," Philosophy of Science 55:39–57.
  40. ^ Martin, 1990: 106. Martin lists the following sources as examples: Edward P. Tryon, "Is the Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?" Nature, 246, 14 December 1973, pp. 396–397; Edward P. Tryon, "What Made the World? New Scientist, 8, March 1984, pp. 14–16; Alexander Vilenkin, "Creation of Universes from Nothing," Physics Letters, 117B, 1982, pp. 25–28; Alexander Vilenkin, "Birth of Inflationary Universes," Physical Review, 27, 1983, pp. 2848–2855; L. P. Grishchuck and Y. B. Zledovich, "Complete Cosmological Theories," The Quantum Structure of Space and Time, ed. M. J. Duff and C. J. Isham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 409–422; Quentin Smith, "The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe," Philosophy of Science, 55, 1988, pp. 39–57.
  41. ^ On the Origin of Everything, David Albert, The New York Times, March 2012
  42. ^ "The Caused Beginning of the Universe: a Response to Quentin Smith." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 623–639.
  43. ^ In the Beginning Was the Beginning, Tufts Now 2014
  44. ^ a b The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe, William Lane Craig
  45. ^ Borde, Arvind; Guth, Alan H.; Villenkin, Alexander (2003). "Inflationary Spacetimes Are Incomplete in Past Directions". Physical Review Letters. 90 (15). American Physical Society: 151301. arXiv:gr-qc/0110012. Bibcode:2003PhRvL..90o1301B. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.151301. PMID 12732026. S2CID 46902994. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
  46. ^ Vilenkin, A. (2007) Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes, p.175
  47. ^ "Physicists & Philosophers debunk the Kalam Cosmological Argument featuring Penrose, Hawking, Guth". YouTube. See also Stenger (2011) Ch. 6.2 demonstrating that these views predate Vilenkin lecture and written work defending a cosmic beginning.
  48. ^ Why Physicists Can't Avoid A Creation Event, New Scientist 2012
  49. ^ Vilenkin, Alexander (2006). Many Worlds in One: The Search for Other Universes. Hill and Wang. ISBN 0809095238.
  50. ^ Vilenkin A (2015). "The Beginning of the Universe". Inference: International Review of Science. 1 (4).
  51. ^ Perlov, Delia; Vilenkin, Alexander (2017). Cosmology for the Curious. Springer. ISBN 3319570382.
  52. ^ Aguirre A and Gratton S (2002). Steady-state eternal inflation; Phys. Rev. D 65, 083507
  53. ^ Victor J. Stenger (28 April 2012). God and the Folly of Faith: The Incompatibility of Science and Religion. Prometheus Books. ISBN 9781616145996.
  54. ^ Victor J. Stenger (15 April 2011). The Fallacy of Fine-Tuning: Why the Universe Is Not Designed for Us. Prometheus Books. p. 244. ISBN 9781616144449.
  55. ^ Craig William Lane, Reasonable Faith Christian Truth and Apologetics Third Edition 118–120
  56. ^ Craig William Lane, Reasonable Faith, Christian Truth and Apologetics, Third Edition, pp. 120–124
  57. ^ Reichenbach, Bruce, "Cosmological Argument", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/#SuccAddiCannFormActuInfi
  58. ^ Martin, 1990: 104–105
  59. ^ Ed Feser: https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2016/09/yeah-but-is-it-actually-actually.html?m=1
  60. ^ Loke, 2017, 55–61, 67–68
  61. ^ Waters B (2013). "Methuselah's Diary and the Finitude of the Past". Philosophia Christi. 15 (2).
  62. ^ Martin, 1990: 103
  63. ^ Martin, 1990: 103–14
  64. ^ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 193–194
  65. ^ Craig and Moreland, 2009: 183–184
  66. ^ "Objections to the Causal Principle".
  67. ^ Oaklander, L. Nathan (2002). "Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience". In Craig Callender (ed.). Time, reality & experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 73–90. ISBN 978-0-521-52967-9.
  68. ^ Balashov, Yuri; Janssen, Michel (2003). "Presentism and Relativity". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 54 (2): 327–346. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.114.5886. doi:10.1093/bjps/54.2.327.
  69. ^ Balashov, Yuri (2007). "A Future for Presentism". Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  70. ^ Response to McCall and Balashov Archived 13 August 2016 at the Wayback Machine, William Lane Craig
  71. ^ "Dr. Craig Answers Questions on the Kalam, Heaven, Free Will, B-Theory, and MORE!" – via YouTube.
  72. ^ Waters, 2015

Sources[edit]

Further reading[edit]

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